NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as th=
at,
though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of
quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference
between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon cl=
aim
to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For =
as
to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strong=
est,
either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the =
same
danger with himself.
And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded =
upon
words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible
rules, called science, which very few have and but in few things, as being =
not
a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look aft=
er
somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of stren=
gth.
For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men=
in
those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make
such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which
almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is,
than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurr=
ing
with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men that howsoever
they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent or more
learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; =
for
they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this
From this equality of ability ariseth equ=
ality
of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire t=
he
same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies;=
and
in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and
sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to
destroy or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass that where an
invader hath no more to fear than another man's single power, if one plant,
sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to
come prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of=
the
fruit of his labour, but also of his life or li=
berty.
And the invader again is in the like danger of another.
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man =
to
secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, =
to
master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power gre=
at
enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also, because th=
ere be
some that, taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of
conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others,
that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not=
by
invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standi=
ng
only on their defence, to subsist. And by
consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a ma=
n's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grie=
f)
in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For ev=
ery
man looketh that his companion should value him=
at
the same rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt or
undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as he=
dares
(which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far
enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his=
contempers, by damage; and from others, by the exampl=
e.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarr=
el. First, compet=
ition;
secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first maketh men invade for gain; the
second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, =
to
make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle;
the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a
different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their
persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, the=
ir
profession, or their name.
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called w=
ar;
and such a war as is of every man against every man. Fo=
r war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting=
, but
in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently
known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of
war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul
weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, b=
ut in
an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known
disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contra=
ry.
All other time is peace.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man =
is
enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without
other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall f=
urnish
them withal. In such condition there is no place=
for
industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no cultu=
re
of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be importe=
d by
sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such thi=
ngs
as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of
time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual
fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nas=
ty,
brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things
that Nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy=
one
another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the
passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him
therefore consider with himself: when taking a journey, he arms himself and
seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when
even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws=
and
public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opi=
nion
he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens,
when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks h=
is
chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by =
my
words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in =
it.
The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more a=
re
the actions that proceed from those passions till they know a law that forb=
ids
them; which till laws be made they cannot know, =
nor
can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make i=
t…
But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were =
in a
condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of
sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual
jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons
pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garris=
ons,
and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon the=
ir neighbours, which is a posture of war. But because th=
ey
uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it
that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men. …
The passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of =
such
things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry =
to
obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient
articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles =
are
they which otherwise are called the laws of nature, whereof I shall speak m=
ore
particularly in the two following chapters.
=
1. Hobbes
is considered to be pessimistic about people, why?
=
2. What
does Hobbes have to say about the differences among individual people and h=
ow
does that play into his ideas on government?
=
3. When
is society at war?
=
4. Why
aren’t Kings in a constant state of war?
=
5. What
do you think of Hobbes final statement?